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Majority of poverty attribution studies have been on middle class adults from developed countries. Where cross cultural studies 
were extended to developing countries, samples were of those not experiencing poverty directly. Possibilities of extending 
generalizations across cultures have therefore been difficult. A modified index was administered on a sample (n=383) from 
Badia, a low income community in Lagos. The result showed that poverty attribution was understandable in terms of 
respondents’ Social and Economic Status. However, while the result confirmed earlier findings that disadvantaged persons 
adopted structural attributions for poverty, it was shown, that the disadvantaged are likely to combine fatalistic and structural 
attributions in compromise explanations. The result therefore challenges past neglect of fatalistic explanations. 
 





Seekings (2005: 1) noted that a plethora of studies interested in attitudes toward distributive justice, poverty and 
inequality has been conducted in ‘societies of North America and Western Europe’ which have lower levels of poverty 
and inequality. Studies of poverty attribution have been limited to samples from middle classes and university students 
from these countries with very few exceptions (e.g. Wollie, 2009; Nasser et al., 2005). Often, where they have been done 
in the developing world, they were cross cultural studies comparing attribution between the global north and south (e.g. 
Hine and Montiel, 1999; Bolitho et al., 2007). Even where this was the case, samples have included middle class citizens 
of the developing countries concerned or students. Most studies conducted have therefore been on people who were not 
experiencing poverty directly. As Shek (2003) noted, to date, there has been no study of how poor people view poverty.  
Harper (2003: 188) argued that social scientists continue covert ‘victim blaming’ by conducting studies on the poor, 
while neglecting studies on the rich, liking this to Ross’ (1977) ‘attribution error’. While Harper (2003) made this assertion 
in respect to over 30 years of attribution research, it is clear that most attribution studies conducted so far have been on 
middle class persons, mostly from advantaged social groups (Shek, 2003). Contrary to Harper’s (2003) argument 
therefore, it is clear that attribution studies have rather made an attribution error by neglecting the view of the poor of 
poverty and how such attributions shape legitimization and action. As Bolitho et al (2007) argued, focusing on a limited 
range of western countries runs the risk of generalizing to different national contexts such as developing countries. Many 
studies in USA have revealed the salience of ‘individualism (Kluegel and Smith, 1986; Smith and Stone, 1989). Hunt 
(1996) however showed that individualistic philosophies are not all encompassing because Americans differ in attitudes 
according to race and geographical locations. Robinson (2009) demonstrated how American beliefs could be understood 
on the basis of an individualist-structural continuum on which attributions and legitimization could be located. As most 
studies were conducted in more secular western societies, the salience of fatalistic explanations has been obliterated. As 
Lepianka et al (2009: 426) noted, in most studies, fatalistic attributions generated low adherence (e.g. Smith and Stone, 
1989; Feagin, 1975; Cozzarelli et al, 2001). Many studies therefore focused on individual and structural explanations 
downplaying the importance of fatalism. This underlines the need for research that acknowledges the historical, social 
and political contexts of different countries (Shirazi and Biel, 2005; Bolitho et al., 2007).  
The salience of fatalistic attribution is discernable from its possible influence on possible action. When structural 
factors are layered with fatalistic factors, people perceive structure as causing poverty but at the same time that fate plays 
a role. Robinson (2009) argued that there is not much action possible (or policy implication) for belief in ‘bad luck’ or 
‘God’s will’. While fatalism is neither individual nor structural, studies in western societies where ‘traditionalism’ and 
religion is on decline underplay its value as an explanatory factor. Robinson (2009: 497) summarized the presumption of 
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western scholars when he proposed that ‘research on mechanisms legitimating structured inequality may be most fruitful 
on how strongly people hold individualistic or structural attributions’. As most studies of attribution have been in the 
developed world, scholars have therefore reported the influence of attribution on the views of the middle classes 
regarding assistance to the poor. Perhaps in the developing world, perceptions by the poor may have different 
consequences for the poor’s responses to their situation. 
 
2. Lay Explanations for Poverty 
 
Feagin (1972: 101-129) advanced three categories of attributions of poverty:  
1. Individualistic: Attributing responsibility for poverty to the poor themselves, including lack of thrift, effort, loose 
morals. 
2. Structural: Encompassing the external and economic forces, including wages, access to good education, lack 
of jobs, and discrimination. 
3. Fatalistic: Entailing forces beyond individuals’ control, including; bad luck, illness. 
Feagin’s study has been replicated (e.g. Cozzarelli et al., 2001; Hunt, 2004; Bullock, 2006; Nasser et al., 2002; 
Bolitho et al., 2007; Hine and Montiel, 1999; Shek, 2003; Robinson, 2009; Nasser et al., 2005; Wollie, 2009). Feagin’s 
(1972) work has therefore formed the basis for current studies regarding attributions of poverty. In virtually all studies, 
poverty attributions have been correlated with respondents’ social and economic characteristics, ideological and political 
orientations. Studies showed that attribution of poverty is correlated with economic self interests; respondents who 
ascribe poverty to individual characteristics are more likely to be of higher incomes and ideologically conservative 
(Cozzarelli et al., 2001). Conversely however, respondents who attribute poverty to structural inequality are more 
poetically liberal (Hunt, 2004). Economically advantaged groups (whites, men) attribute poverty to individualistic factors 
while disadvantaged groups (minorities, women) attribute poverty to external or structural factors, thus indicating a 
correlation between attributions, sex, and race (Feagin, 1972; Nasser et al., 2002). Individual attribution has also been 
correlated with age and type of academic training (Guimond et al., 1989), race (Hunt, 1996), gender- related social roles 
and social power (Shirazi and Biel, 2005) and class (Nasser, 2007). However, contrary to expectation, education has 
been found to be positively correlated with structural attribution; education, it is argued, has an enlightening effect, as 
higher education enhances awareness of inequality and consequently evokes compassion toward the disadvantaged 
(Hunt, 1996).  
 
3. Objective of the Study 
 
Many studies of poverty attribution have thus been on people who were not experiencing poverty directly. There is 
therefore, a neglect of the need to understand the attributions of the ‘really’ poor of poverty. A study of the attribution of 
the poor in Badia, a low income community (otherwise, slum) in Lagos Nigeria therefore enhances the understanding of 
the perception of the poor of causes of poverty. Attribution of causes of poverty has been linked to respondents’ Social 
Economic Status (SES) (Kluegel and Smith, 1986). Studies in western societies have found that disadvantaged people 
are likely to combine structural and individual attributions in compromise explanations (Hunt, 1996; Bobo, 1991). The 
main objective of the study therefore was to investigate empirically if the SES hypothesis is valid for a sample of 
respondents in the developing world who are actually experiencing poverty, and if there are possible variations in 
combinations of explanations from the widely held individual – structural continuum (Robinson, 2009) which has been 
widely reported in many studies in the global north. Consequently, an increased number of items eliciting fatalistic beliefs 
were included in the research instrument to test if the fatalistic attribution type truly existed as an explanatory construct in 
the developing world.  
 
4. Research Methods  
 
I conducted a survey with a sample size of 383. The sample size was determined using the Raosoft sample size 
calculator online (@http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html), based on a standard error margin of 5%, a 95% confidence 
level and a 50% response distribution and estimated population of Badia of 120,000 (NPC, 1997). Data was collected 
using a questionnaire that required respondents to rate 38 items on causes of poverty on a Likert scale of 1 to 5, (where 
1= strongly disagree and 5= strongly agree). Highest possible score was 190, while lowest was 38. Higher scores meant 
higher agreements with item. Data was analyzed using Principal Components Analysis (PCA) and bivariate correlation. 
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5. Results  
 
Results of PCA shows that factor analysis was an appropriate extraction method for the data obtained given a Kaiser 
Meyer- Olkin (KMO) measure of sample adequacy of 0.802 and Bartlett Test of Sphericity (BTS) X2 = 6612.03 (df = 300), 
p ޒ .001. This indicates a relationship between rotated variables and sample size adequacy. Two stages of factor 
analyses were run. In the first stage, factor analysis produced eigen values for the 38 items. In the next stage, PCA was 
repeated excluding thirteen items whose eigen values were lower than of 0.05, and thus contributing insignificantly to 
factor loading. Varimax rotation was applied on the remaining 25 items extracting three factors; individual, fatalistic and 
structural attributions of poverty.  
 
Table 1: Rotated component matrix, mean and SD of attribution factors 
 
 Components Mean SD 1 2 3
Poor people don’t plan .832 2.08 1.14 
Poor people waste resources/do not save .811 1.89 1.08 
Poor people lack motivation/efforts to improve themselves .782 2.04 1.04 
Poor people lack sexual control .766 1.96 0.98 
People are poor because they are lazy .764 1.95 1.06 
The poor lack talents or skills .755 2.27 1.12 
Poor people have low intelligence .732 1.82 0.95 
The poor lack ambition .696 2.19 1.16 
The world is just: People get what they deserve .602 2.05 1.00 
People have the same chances to succeed .530 2.09 1.10 
People's occupations are a calling from God .798 3.54 1.18 
Successful ones are the chosen ones of God .756 3.41 1.34 
The poor have bad destiny .728 3.12 1.43 
Poverty is the result of evil works of enemies .685 3.13 1.17 
Some people will be rewarded on earth; others in heaven .651 3.86 0.95 
Success depends on luck .649 2.91 1.14 
Life chances are spiritually determined .636 3.78 1.08 
There is heaven where things will be better than on earth .609 4.19 0.85 
The Government is inefficiently run .828 3.81 1.25 
The government is corrupt/ dishonest .818 3.87 1.36 
Employers are not paying enough .744 4.08 0.94 
Government does not provide enough good Jobs .740 3.53 1.47 
Western capitalists are the cause of poverty and underdevelopment in Nigeria .649 3.29 1.30 
Government is not providing enough access to education .548 3.99 0.97 
 
As table 1 indicates, factor loading for individual attribution ranged from 0.832 for the item ‘poor people don’t plan’ to 
0.530 for the item ‘people have the same chances to succeed’. However, with the highest mean rating of 2.27 the item 
‘poor people lack talent/skills’ is the most important item in explaining individual attribution. Factor loading for fatalistic 
attribution ranged from 0.798 for the item ‘people’s occupations are a calling from God’ to 0.609 for the item ‘there is a 
heaven where things will be better than on earth’. The latter item, with a mean rating of 4.19 is thus the most important 
fatalistic item. Result for the structural sub-dimension shows that factor loading ranged from 0.828 for the item ‘the 
government is inefficiently run’ to 0.548 for the item ‘government is not providing enough access to education’. With a 
mean rating of 4.08, the item ‘employers are not paying enough’ is the most important item in this category. However, 
with the highest overall mean rating for all items, the item ‘there is a heaven where things will be better than on earth’ 
(mean = 4.19) a fatalistic item, is the most important single explanation that Badia respondents have for poverty exits. 
 
Table 2: Total variance explained for poverty attribution 
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The three factors extracted cumulatively accounted for 57.18% of variance in poverty attribution. This variance is 
relatively high (see table 2) compared for example with Wollie (2009: 256) whose three factors accounted for 30.31%. 
Similarly, Bolitho et al. (2007: 16) reported 55% variance; Nasser et al (2005: 6) reported 55.96% variance after 
extracting six factors while Nasser et al (2002: 106) reported 40.2%, 41.7% and 44.4% for Lebanese, Portuguese and 
South African sub-samples respectively. Hine and Montiel (1999: 950), who extracted five factors, reported 45% variance. 
The result therefore shows that in comparison with other studies, the result from the present study shows a better factor 
output. The percentage of variance diminishes significantly after the three factors were extracted thus diminishing the 
need to extract other factors. The three factors extracted are consistent with Feagin’s (1972) original typology. Factor 1, 
individual attribution, with ten 10 accounts for 23.66% of variance while factor 2, fatalistic attribution with eight items and 
factor 3 structural attribution with seven items accounted for 17.85% and 15.69% respectively. Cronbach’s alpha test (see 
Table 2) for the 25 items used for the second PCA showed a reliability of 0.68 which is ‘acceptable’. The individualistic 
sub-scale was ‘excellent’ with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.91, mean = 20.35, SD = 7.86, the fatalistic sub-scale was ‘very good’ 
and reliable with Cronbach’s alpha = 0.86, mean = 27.93, SD = 6.60 and the structural sub-scale also ‘very good’ given a 
Cronbach’s alpha = 0.85, mean = 22.57 and SD = 5.56. Comparative overall rating of all attributions shows that structural 
attribution with the highest mean rating of 27.93 is the most prevalent attribution among the people of Badia (see table 3).  
 
Table 3: Cronbach's alpha, means and SD for attribution sub scales  
 Cronbach’s alpha Mean SD No. of items 
Individual 0.91 20.35 7.86 10
Structural 0.86 27.93 6.60 7
Fatalistic 0.85 22.57 5.56 8
All 0.68 74.30 9.70 25
 
Furthermore, bivariate zero-order correlations were obtained for sub-dimensions of attribution and social-demographics. 
Results shown in table 4 indicates that individual attribution is negatively correlated with gender, r = -0.186, p < 0.01 (2- 
tailed) and religion, r = -0.111, P < 0.05 (1- tailed) but positively correlated with age, r = 0.170, p < 0.01 (2- tailed), 
income, r = 0.302, p < 0.01(2- tailed). Fatalistic attribution however showed significant correlations with age, r = 0.416, p 
< 0.01 (2- tailed), education, r = -0.421, p < 0.01 (2- tailed), income, r = -0.485, p < 0.01 (2-tailed), work type, r = 0.445, p 
< 0.01 (2-tailed), position at work, r = 0.362, p < 0.01(2-tailed), ethnicity, r = 0.282, p < 0.01(2-tailed) and religion, r 
=0.358, p < 0.01 (2- tailed). Similarly, structural attribution is correlated with gender, r = 0.279, p < 0.01; 2-tailed), age, r 
=0 .121, p < 0.05 (1- tailed), education, r = .215, p < 0.01( 2-tailed), work type, r = -0.439, P < 0.01 (2-tailed), ethnicity, r = 
0.181, p < 0.01 (2-tailed) and religion, r = -0.353, P < 0.01 (2-tailed). 
 
Table 4: Zero-order correlations for poverty attributions and demographics 
 
**. p < 0.01 (2-tailed), *. p < 0.05 (2-tailed 
 
Correlation coefficients showed divergences and convergences with the literature. Hunt (1996: 314) concluded that the 
effects of independent variables on poverty attributions varied across groups. Thus the ideas that these processes 
operate in a similar pattern for different groups and locations is not sustainable. Like many other studies, this study found 
effects of, gender, age and income on attributions (Hunt, 2004, 1996; Nasser et al., 2005; Wollie, 2009; Hine and Montiel, 
1999). While women are more structural than men in attributions, the younger and the less educated are also found to be 
more structural (Shirazi and Biel, 2005). Of note however, the present study does not find a significant relationship 
between education and individual attribution, even though education predicts structural attribution. Hunt (1996) argued 
that education has an enlightening effect. Nasser et al (2002: 112) averred that education is a ‘double-edged sword’ thus 
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while education as a signpost to upward mobility may be expected to enhance individualism, studies have found that 
liberal and humanistic education enhances the appeal to structural explanations. While the Badia sample was in no way 
composed of highly educated people, the result still showed no correlation between education and individual attribution. 
Other studies have reported a similar finding (Klugel and Smith, 1986). Huber and Form, 1973). Given that the 
educational gap among Badia respondents is not wide, statistical significance may have been unlikely. However it is 
possible that a comparative study with a more educationally diverse sample may provide a different result. Bobo (1991) 
argued that education has an enlightening effect as more educated people are more able to empathize with the 
conditions of the disadvantaged. The role of education has therefore been subject of debates. While some studies have 
found positive correlation between education and structural attribution, some have reported a negative relationship. Thus, 
theoretically, the effect of education has been confusing (Nasser et al., 2002).  
 
5.1 Comparative Ratings of Poverty Attribution Sub-dimensions 
 
The three sub-dimensions of poverty attribution were compared to determine respondents’ preferred attributions. This 
was attained by comparing the statistical mean ratings of each attribution choice. Respondents’ preferred attribution was 
taken to be the attribution category where he/she recorded the highest mean rating. Individual mean ratings were 
calculated by adding up the total Likert scale scores for each sub-dimension after factor extraction (at this stage, PCA 
had reduced the number of items from 38 to 25). Total scores were then divided by the total number of items in each sub-
dimension (Individualistic; n = 10; Fatalistic, n = 8; structural; n = 7). Comparative ratings for all the sub-dimensions are 
depicted in table 5. The dominant poverty attribution among inhabitants of Badia community is structural attribution, which 
is adopted by 59% of the respondents. However, 37.1% of respondents preferred fatalistic explanation. This result is 
consistent with the ‘actor and observer’ thesis (Robinson and Bell, 1978) and the fundamental ‘attribution error’ (Ross, 
1977) both of which propose that lower economic status respondents attribute poverty to factors external to themselves. 
This has been the consistent finding of most studies of poverty attribution (Hine and Montiel, 1999; Nasser at al., 2002; 
Nasser et al., 2005; Wollie, 2009; Bolitho et al., 2007). People of lower economic status consistently preferred structural 
attribution. Wichowsky (2007: 1) argued that in areas with higher income inequality, people often blame the society for 
poverty. Explanation of poverty is therefore a function of respondents in question and the kind of inequality that exists in 
one’s environment (Wilson, 1986; Wichowsky, 2007). Studies finding predominant structural attribution than individual 
attribution reported that their findings support the system ‘blame hypothesis’ (Wollie, 2009; Nasser at al., 2005), as 
against the ‘culture of poverty’ thesis where individual attributions predominate (Bullock, 2006).  
  
Table 5: Preferred attributions 
Frequency %
Individual Attribution 15 3.9
Structural Attribution 226 59.0 
Fatalistic Attribution 142 37.1 
Total 383 100.0 
 
However it is notable that while in past studies, structural attribution have been found to be predominant among the 
under-privileged, almost in all cases, structural attribution has been combined with individual attribution with diminished 
report of fatalism (see Wollie, 2009; Nasser et al., 2005) leading scholars to report that fatalistic attributions were less 
significant (Lepianka et al., 2009). In light of the above therefore, the result from the Badia sample diverges from the main 
flow of the literature given that 37.1% of respondents reported fatalist beliefs. While one may be tempted to conclude that 
fatalism is diminished when studies are conducted in western countries, it is notable that studies in Africa and other 
developing countries also reported higher individual than fatalistic explanations. Wollie (2009: 264-265) for example, 
while acknowledging that Ethiopians believe that causes of poverty are controlled by supernatural powers, still reported 
that the fatalistic factor scored low percentage of variance in his data than individualistic explanation. Similarly, Nasser at 
al (2005) reported higher individual attribution than fatalism among an Indian sample. While reporting significantly higher 
structural and individual attribution among a combined South African, Lebanese and Portuguese sample, Nasser et al 
(2002: 110) reported higher fatalistic beliefs among South Africans than Portuguese and Lebanese. Surprisingly however, 
they reported (Nasser et al, 2002: 112) that White and Colored South Africans showed the highest level of fatalistic 
beliefs in their cross national study. Furthermore, the result from the present study supports the value inconsistency and 
compromise explanations linked to Mann’s (1970) argument that values inconsistency is the basis for social order. While 
Bobo (1991:87) linked value inconsistency to the existence of an egalitarian structuralist outlook layered upon 
ISSN 2039-2117 (online) 
ISSN 2039-9340 (print) 
        Mediterranean Journal of Social Sciences 
            MCSER Publishing, Rome-Italy 
Vol 5 No 20 
September  2014 
          
 1998 
individualism among oppressed groups in America, results from Badia shows that srtucturalist outlook is layered upon 
fatalistic beliefs. Many studies reported that participants used more than one attribution concurrently (Harper, 2003: 186). 
Verkutyen (1988) estimated that typically only about 7% of respondents use single explanations in attribution research. 
This indicates that split consciousness is a part of the cognitive processes of the underprivileged. The present study 
produced evidence of split/dual consciousness. While acknowledging that structural barriers cause poverty (59%), 37% of 
the sample preferred fatalistic attribution. Thus while Bobo (1991) described split consciousness as the layering of 
individual and structural attribution, in the present study, the result shows that split consciousness entailed layering 
structural with fatalistic attributions. The result therefore contradicts the widely held belief that people’s attributions fits 
neatly into two ‘camps’ (Wichowsky, 2007: 18) when thinking about causes of personal economic failure or success 




The findings of the study supports but significantly contradict previous studies on poverty attribution. Studies in USA and 
European countries have reported predominant individual attribution (Feagin, 1972; Kluegel and Smith, 1986). Others 
have uncovered ambivalence where race, region and contexts are introduced (Hunt, 1996; Robinson, 2009). Robinson 
(2009) proposed that American attributions for poverty could be situated within an individual-structural continuum. There 
is evidence that attribution beliefs vary between cultures (Morçöl, 1997; Nasser et al., 2005). However, cross cultural 
studies have found that while respondents in Western countries preponderantly attributed poverty to individual factors, 
their counterparts in less developed countries were more structural in explanation with individual explanations coming 
second (Bolitho et al, 2007). Hine and Montiel (1999: 954) reported that Filipinos blamed the poor and their government 
more for poverty than Canadians. They however observed that ‘had individuals from the lower classes been surveyed, 
their responses may have been more in line with … initial prediction’. Perhaps more significantly, studies in other 
developing countries repeatedly reported predominantly structural explanations layered with individual attributions among 
their samples (Nassrer et al., 2002, 2005; Wollie, 2009). The difference in the result of the present study may be 
attributable to two factors. In the first instance, most of the studies conducted on respondents in developing countries did 
not sample the ‘really poor’. Like western studies, they concentrated on studying (university) students (Wollie, 2009; 
Nasser et al., 2002, 2005) or middle class anti- poverty activists (Bolitho et al., 2007), who were upwardly mobile, western 
educated and more likely to exhibit western values. Secondly, past studies had been reluctant to include statistically 
significant number of items eliciting fatalistic responses in their research instruments. Hunt (2004: 837) used only two 
items related to ‘God’s will’ to construct a fatalistic sub-scale that yielded a moderate Crobach’s alpha of 0.64. Hunt 
(2004) therefore argued that statistical insignificance of fatalistic explanations in past studies is due to the paucity of items 
eliciting fatalistic response. Similarly, Bolitho et al (2007: 19) argued that ‘fate’ has been an under-represented factor as 
spiritual beliefs are absent from current instruments ‘despite their central significance in many belief systems’ (emphasis 
is mine). They suggested that this shortfall may be redressed by including items in the point of view of the poor 
themselves, given that current items are mostly derived from western sources beginning from the work of Feagin (1972). 
The study therefore confirms Bolitho et al’s (2007: 19) fears that these constructs are not fully relevant across cultural 
contexts. This of course does not diminish the fact that they may be similar where applied to similar socio-economic 
categories. Brimeyer (2008) recently confirmed that the belief in ‘divine intervention’ is a relevant construct in the 
attribution maps of the disadvantaged when sufficiently elicited. The present study, following the suggestions of Hunt 
(2004), Bolitho et al (2007) and Brimeyer (2008) confirmed that indeed the fatalistic construct is real when elicited with 




The results from the present study showed that layering of attribution is not only in an individual-structural continuum. 
Perhaps the layering of fatalistic attributions with structural attributions offer better explanations of failure to take action in 
the face of injustice, given the more extreme effect of fatalistic attribution than individual attribution. Robinson (2009) 
recently argued that there are not many actions or policy options possible where people adduce poverty to fate. The 
finding that fatalistic attribution is heavily layered with structural attributions by the disadvantaged answers the question 
why people remained reluctant to engage in collective action despite level of identification or perception of efficacy or 
ripeness of structural conditions. As Harper (2003) noted, attribution research has failed to generate effective conclusions 
that might aid in the fight against poverty. No doubt, with attribution studies focusing on attributions of the rich for poverty, 
the prospects of generating ground for mobilization to fight poverty are impaired. Contrary to what many past studies 
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reported, this study has shown that fatalism is a real explanation of poverty among the disadvantaged. However, as the 
study was conducted using a sample of predominantly poor and less educated sample, it will be necessary for future 
studies to replicate the study to confirm the validity of the findings and to ascertain if the inclusion of more fatalistic items 




Bobo, L. (1991). Social Responsibility, Individualism, and Redistributive Policies. Sociological Forum 6: 71-91.  
Bolitho, F.H., Car, S.C. and Fletcher, R.B. (2007). Public Thinking about Poverty: How it Matters and how to Measure it. International 
Journal of Nonprofit and Voluntary Sector Marketing, 12: 13-22. 
Brimeyer, T. (2008). Research Note: Religious Affiliation and Poverty Explanations: Individual, Structural, and Divine Causes. 
Sociological Focus, 41(3): 226-237. 
Bullock, H. (2006) . Justifying Inequality: A Social Psychological Analysis of Beliefs about Poverty and the Poor. National Poverty Centre 
Working Paper Series 06-08. Downloaded at: http://www.npc.umich.edu/publications/working_papers/  
Cozzarelli, C., Wilkinson, A. and Tagler, M. (2001). Attitudes Toward the Poor and Attributions. Journal of Social Issues, 57(2): 207-227. 
Feagin, J. (1972). Poverty: We still believe that God helps them who help themselves. Psychology Today, 6: 101-129.  
Feagin, J. (1975). Subordinating Poor Persons: Welfare and American Beliefs. Englewood Cliffs, N.J: Prentice-Hall. 
Guimond, S. Begin, G. & Palmer, D.L. (1989). Education and Causal Attributions: The Development of `person-blame' and `system-
blame' Ideology. Social Psychology Quarterly, 52: 126-140. 
Harper, D.J. (2003). Poverty and Discourse: In: S. Carr and T.S. Sloan (eds.) Poverty and Psychology: From Global Perspective Local 
Practice. New York: Kluwer-Plenum. 
Hine, D. and Montiel, C. (1999). Poverty in Developing Nations: A Cross-Cultural Attributional Analysis. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 29: 943-959. 
Huber, J. and Form, W. (1973). Income and Ideology: an Analysis of the American Political formula. New York: Free Press.  
Hunt, M. (1996). The Individual, Society, or both? A Comparison of Black, Latino and White Beliefs about the Causes of Poverty. Social 
Forces, 75(1) : 293-322.  
Hunt, M.O. (2004). Race/Ethnicity and Beliefs about Wealth and Poverty. Social Science Quarterly, 85(3): 827–853. 
Kluegel, J. R. and Smith, E.R. (1986). Beliefs About Inequality: Americans’ Views of What Is and What Ought to Be. New York: Aldine De Gruyter. 
Lepianka, D., Oorschot, W. and Gelissen, J. (2009). Popular Explanations of Poverty: A Critical Discussion of Empirical Research. Jnl 
Soc. Pol., 38(3): 421–438. 
Mann, M. (1970). The Social Cohesion of Liberal Democracies. American Sociological Review, 35: 423-39. 
Nasser, R.. (2007). Does Subjective Class Predict the Causal Attribution for Poverty? Journal of Social Sciences, 3 (4): 197-201. 
Nasser, R., Abouchedid, K. and Khashan, H. (2002). Perceptions of the Causes of Poverty Comparing three National Groups: Lebanon, 
Portugal and South Africa. Current Research in Social Psychology, 8(7): 101-118.  
Nasser, R., Singhal, S. and Abouchedid, K. (2005). Causal Attributions for Poverty among Indian Youth. Current Research in Social 
Psychology, 11(1): 1-13. 
NPC (1997). National Population Commission, Nigeria. Population Projections, 1996. 
Robinson, J. W. (2009). American Poverty Cause Beliefs and Structured Inequality Legitimation. Sociological Spectrum, 29: 489–518. 
Robinson, R. and Bell, W. (1978). Equality, Success, and Social Justice in England and the United States. American Sociological 
Review, 43: 125-43. 
Ross, L. (1977). The Intuitive Psychologist and his Shortcomings: Distortions in the Attribution Process. In: L. Berkowitz (ed.) Advances 
in Experimental Social Psychology, Vol. 10. New York: Academic Press.  
Seekings, J. (2005). The Mutability of istributive Justice Attitudes in South Africa. CSSR Working Paper No. 125. University of Cape 
Town. Available @hhtp//www.cssr.uct.ac.za/index.html. 
Shek, D. (2003). Chinese People’s Explanations of Poverty: The Perceived Causes of Poverty Scale. Research on Social Work Practice, 
13(5): 622-640. 
Shirazi, R. and Biel, A. (2005). Internal-External Causal Attributions and Perceived Government Responsibility for Need Provision. 
Journal of Cross-Cultural Psychology, 36(1), 96-116.  
Smith, K. B. and Stone, L.H. (1989). Rags, Riches, and Bootstraps: Beliefs about the Causes of Wealth and Poverty. Sociological 
Quarterly, 30(1): 93–107. 
Verkuyten (1998). Self-Categorization and the Explanation of Ethnic Discrimination. Journal of Community and Applied Social 
Psychology, 8: 395-407.  
Wichowsky, A. (2007). Race, Class and Place: how perceptions of inequality structure beliefs about the poor. Paper presented at the 
annual meeting of the Midwest Political Science Association, April 12-14, 2007, Chicago. 
Wilson, G. (1996). Toward a Revised Framework for Examining Beliefs about the Causes of Poverty. The Sociological Quarterly, 37(3): 
413–428. 
Wollie, C.W. (2009). Causal Attributions for Poverty among Youths in Bahir Dar, Amhara Region, Ethiopia. Journal of Social, 
Evolutionary, and Cultural Psychology, 3(3): 251-272. 
http://www.raosoft.com/samplesize.html 
